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PLENARY POWER OVER INDIAN AFFAIRS-A
DOCTRINE ROOTED IN PREJUDICE
Irene K. Harvey*
Introduction
Where there is the duty of protection, there is the power.' This
was the theory upon which the United States Supreme Court in
1886 rested its decision that Congress had the power to vest
criminal jurisdiction over Indians accused of murdering Indians
in federal courts as opposed to state forums.2 While the Court
thus resolved the narrow question in United States v. Kagama,
the case's rationale and rule simultaneously generated the doc-
trine of plenary power over Indians.' Later Supreme Court deci-
sions have both conceptually refined and broadly applied the doc-
trine enunciated in Kagama.
Though Kagama referred to the power of the "General
Government," 4 subsequent decisions clarify that Congress wields
* First-place Winner, 1983 Indian Law Writing Competition.
1. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
2. Id. at 375, 385. The author of this paper readily acknowledges the variety of pre-
ferences concerning appellations for the peoples originally inhabiting the United States. In
the main, the author has chosen to use the designation Indians instead of Native
Americans, tribal names, or other terms.
3. See F. COHEN, FEDERAL IN z AN LAW 90 (1942); Carter, Race and Power Politics
as Aspects of Federal Guardianship over American Indians: Land Related Cases,
1887-1924, 4 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 197, 209 (1976). The Kagama Court's construction of
the notion that the duty of protection leads to power occurs within a paragraph near the
end of the opinion reading:
It seems to us that this [enactment of a federal criminal law encompassing certain acts
of tribal Indians within reservation limits] is within the competency of Congress. These
Indian tribes are wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on the United
States. Dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights.
They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from them no protection. Because of
local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest
enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of
dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been
promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.
Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383-84 [emphasis in original].
4. Id. at 384. The plenary power "has always been recognized by the Executive and
by Congress, and by this Court, whenever the question has arisen." Id.
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this power.5 Similarly, though Kagama neglected to restrain the
reach of plenary power, and later opinions even expressly de-
clared that the judicial branch must decline invitations to recog-
nize parameters of Congress' paramount authority, 6 the Court
currently admits to constitutional limitations upon the exercise of
plenary power.7
On one hand, the Court has thus conceptually refined the doc-
trine by naming it a congressional power and subjecting it to con-
stitutional scrutiny. On the other hand, the Court has continued
to refer to the plenary power doctrine as permitting broad exer-
cises of congressional power in derogation of Indian rights. While
Kagama's facts allowed plenary authority over criminal adjudica-
tion, plenary power now extends over "matters of Indian
affairs." 8 The disposition of tribal property, 9 the regulation of
liquor traffic, 10 and the exercise of Indian sovereignty" are
among those concerns subjected to the doctrine.
Development of Congressional Plenary Power over
Indian Affairs
A brief survey of Supreme Court opinions reveals both the
confines and the expanse of plenary power. Yet, the most surpris-
ing result is not what the study reveals; rather, its extraordinary
nature grows from what the examination fails to reveal. What is
the constitutional source of the plenary power doctrine?
The United States Supreme Court, ultimate arbiter of the Con-
stitution, looks to that document's clauses to gauge the legitimacy
of congressional action. The Congress, a branch of government
possessing only enumerated powers, exceeds its authority when its
acts are unrelated to the concerns specified in the Constitution.
12
5. Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439
U.S. 463, 501 (1979); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); Delaware Tribal
Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 83-84 (1977); United States v. Nice, 241 U.S.
591, 597 (1916); Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478, 485 (1914); United States v. San-
doval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903);
Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 484, 486, 488 (1899).
6. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913); United States v. Rickert, 188
U.S. 432, 445 (1903); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903); Cherokee Na-
tion v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 308 (1902).
7. See Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977).
8. Id. at 83-84.
9. Id. at 83; Tiger v. Western Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 311 (1911).
10. United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 597 (1916). See Perrin v. United States, 232
U.S. 478, 482 (1914); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 48 (1913).




In subscribing to the principle that Congress has plenary author-
ity without attempting to connect the doctrine to a constitutional
concern, the Court has consistently overlooked this fundamental
premise of constitutional law. Cohen, when discussing Kagama
and its heirs, summarized the situation by observing: "Reference
to the so-called 'plenary' power of Congress . . . becomes so fre-
quent... that it may seem captious to point out that there is ex-
cellent authority for the view that Congress has no constitutional
power over Indians except what is conferred by the commerce
clause and other clauses of the Constitution."13 Cohen, reading
Kagama, found the roots of the plenary power doctrine not in the
Constitution but in the "practical necessity of protecting the In-
dians and the nonexistence of such power in the states.' I
This paper does not challenge Cohen's explanation; instead it
seeks to elaborate on Cohen's analysis by asking: why is it nec-
essary to protect Indians? The study proceeds on the premise that
a court responds to a "situation in terms of how it defines or in-
terprets the situation," 15 and demonstrates that, whereas dis-
covering authority in the Constitution for plenary power is a
futile effort, locating the source of the doctrine in bias is a pro-
ductive work. A search for the source of plenary power essen-
tially establishes that the Court's interpretation of Indian condi-
tions from a prejudicial point of view dictated the Court's dis-
criminatory response: Indians, being a race inferior to white
Americans, need protection and pupilage. And there being the
obligation, there is the power.
12. See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); D.
ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER-FEDERAL AND STATE ch. 103 (1974).
13. COHEN, supra note 3, at 90. Indians are explicitly mentioned twice in the Con-
stitution: Congress has the power "[t]o regulate Commerce... with the Indian Tribes,"
art. I, § 8; amend. XIV, § 2 amending art. I, § 2, provides that "Indians not taxed" shall
be excluded in apportioning congressional representatives among the states.
14. COHEN, supra note 3, at 90. Cohen's focus on "practical necessity" as the foun-
dation for Kagama's formulation of the plenary power doctrine derives support from the
last paragraph of the opinion itself:
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race once powerful,
now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the
safety of those among whom they dwell. It must exist in that government, because it
never has existed anywhere else, because the theatre of its exercise is within the geo-
graphical limits of the United States, because it has never been denied, and because it
alone can enforce its laws on all tribes.
Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384-85.
15. R. BERKHOFER, A BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 33 (1969).
Berkhofer formed this thesis of interpretation and response with respect to the behavior
of the "human organism." Id.
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The process here employed to demonstrate that the plenary
power doctrine is a product of prejudice basically divides into
two phases. The first part of the paper develops the Court's
transformation of prejudice into legal principle by examining the
language of Supreme Court opinions and then discussing the
Court's prejudicial attitude and its discriminatory behavior. The
paper's second part considers the extent to which the plenary
power doctrine is the result of racism and ethnocentrism, and
then studies the functions performed by the doctrine in structur-
ing the relationship between Indians and white America. The
paper concludes by deliberating the desirability of courts' and ad-
vocates' continued usage of the doctrine.
Transformation of Prejudice into Principle
Interpretation and Response:
Indians are Inferior-They Need Protection and Pupilage
To label the plenary power doctrine an outgrowth of prejudice,
one must first clarify the concept of prejudice. Prejudice is basi-
cally an attitude of prejudgment.' 6 While the word "prejudice"
commonly evokes negative connotations, prejudice, of course,
can operate as an ally of those who are favorably prejudged. 7
This positive attitude is not the type of prejudice a reader often
encounters in exploring Supreme Court opinions developing con-
gressional plenary power over Indian tribes. On the contrary, the
Court convincingly transmitted the message that Indians are in-
ferior.
The stigma of inferiority inflicted upon the Indian race in
Supreme Court opinions divides, in this paper, into three themes.
Indians are marked as inferior in terms of (1) their civilization,
(2) their character, and (3) their claims. Separating the investiga-
tion into distinct pigeonholes may imply that the legal opinions
allow for convenient, clear-cut analysis. Yet, the fact is that often
the themes intermingle. Perhaps nowhere is this interlacing more
apparent than in United States v. Sandoval,"8 a case the Court
decided in 1913.
The Court in Sandoval, within the context of a criminal pro-
secution, faced the question whether congressional legislation for-
bidding the introduction of liquor into New Mexico Indian coun-
16. R. DANIELS & H. KITANO, AMERICAN RACISM: EXPLORATION OF THE NATURE OF
PREJUDICE 14 (1970).
17. Id.
18. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
[Vol. 10
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try encompassed the state's Pueblo Indian community, a com-
munity owning its lands in fee simple. In arriving at its decision
that the pueblo lands fell subject to plenary power and thus to the
liquor legislation, the Court had to determine the underlying
issue, the status of the lands' occupants.' 9 In deciding that the
community was a "dependent" one requiring congressional pro-
tection,20 the Court faced the hurdle posed by United States v.
Joseph,2' an 1876 case involving a determination that this group
was not Indian for purposes of legislation regulating intercourse
between Indians and non-Indians. This factor perhaps explains
the strenuous effort the Sandoval Court devoted to establishing
the pueblo people as a dependent Indian community. The Court
accomplished its objective by leveling the cultural and personal
integrity of the group.
The Court introduced its deliberations on the status of the
pueblo inhabitants by noting: "The people of the pueblos, al-
though sedentary rather than nomadic in their inclinations, and
disposed to peace and industry, are nevertheless Indians in race,
customs and domestic government. ' 2 In the next sentence the
Court revealed that this group, always residing in "isolated com-
munities," pursuing "primitive modes of life," tending to
"superstition and fetishism," and serving "crude customs in-
herited from their ancestors," was "essentially a simple, unin-
formed and inferior people. ' 23 The Court both in its own words
and by adoption of excerpts from government reports, elaborated
19. Id. at 38.
20. Id. at 47.
21. 94 U.S. 614 (1876). The Joseph Court found that since an act forbidding settle-
ment by non-Indians upon Indian lands did not apply to the Pueblo Indians, the United
States could not prosecute non-Indian settlers for violation of the act. See id. at 617, 619.
The Joseph Court based its determination concerning the group's status on the grounds
that the Pueblo Indians adopted the Spanish language and Christian religion, manufac-
tured home goods, fostered integrity and virtue, assimilated the names, customs, and
habits of their white neighbors, and had few criminal records. "In short," observed the
Court:
they are a peaceable, industrious, intelligent, honest and virtuous people. They are In-
dians only in feature, complexion, and a few of their habits .... The degree of civiliza-
tion which they had attained, their willing submission to all the laws of the Mexican
government [previously ruling New Mexico] . . . and their absorption into the general
mass of the population ... all forbid the idea that they should be classed with the In-
dian tribes.
Id. at 616-17.
22. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39 (1913).
23. Id.
19821 NOTES
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upon the inferior complexion of not only the civilization but also
the character of the pueblo residents.
Sandoval rather comprehensively treated elements of pueblo
culture, including its propensity for paganism. The Court quoted
a report establishing that the "'pagan"' custom of the "'secret
dance from which all whites are excluded is perhaps one of the
greatest evils . . . . [I]t is little less than a ribald system of de-
bauchery."' 2 Contemplating the group's system of government,
the Court noted the "'one-man domination"' practiced by the
pueblo governor, 21 and noted, too, that despite the Indian gov-
ernment's infliction of cruel punishments, the governed clung
tenaciously to the system. 26 Continuing to dwell upon govern-
ment structure, the tribunal repeated the conclusion drawn by
one report: as long as the pueblo people were "'permitted to live
a communal life and exercise their ancient form of government,
just so long will there be ignorant and wild Indians to civilize."7
Furthermore, government was not the only source of concern for
the Court: as soon as an Indian child returned from a govern-
ment-sponsored boarding school, the pueblo residents forced In-
dian dress upon the child; in fact, "'he is compelled to submit to
all the ancient and heathen customs of this people.' ,28 The Court
thus did not ignore the child-rearing practices of the community
and similarly did not neglect its marital practices: these persons
"'have no marriage ceremony that is binding . . .. If marriage
and divorce laws could be enforced, it would be a great blessing
to these people.' -129
Interspersed among Sandoval's comments upon the uncivilized
religious, governmental, child-rearing, and marital practices of
the pueblo people are evaluations of the character of the group's
members. While the Court conceded that the inhabitants of the
communal fee lands were "industrially superior" to reservation
Indians, the Court also maintained "they are intellectually and
morally inferior to many of them." 30 For the tribunal, one in-
dicator of moral inferiority was the finding that these Indians
were "easy victims to the evils and debasing influence of intox-
24. Id. at 42.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 43.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 44.
30. Id. at 41. On the same page of the opinion the Court quoted a report finding the
pueblo inhabitants too uninformed to vote "intelligently." Id.
[Vol. 10
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icants." 3' Indeed, the Court believed "'[i]ntemperance is the
besetting sin of the Pueblo."' 32 The Court quoted from a report
to establish that family life, like drinking habits, suffered moral
deficiencies: the family relations of the group's members featured
"'[i]mmorality and a general laxness.'
As the reader proceeds through Sandoval's interpretation of
Indian culture and character, yet another theme becomes evident
in addition to those of inferior civilization and inferior make-up.
These people, believed the High Court, needed agents and super-
intendents "guarding their interests," for they were "dependent
upon the fostering care and protection of the Government." ' 34 In
considering the pueblo people's need for "tutelage," the Court
first commented on their condition under Spanish and Mexican
rule. Under the direction of missionaries, "'considerable ad-
vancement had been made in civilizing and christianizing the
race."' In light of their "'degraded condition, however, and ig-
norance generally,"' these people "'still doubtless, required...
fostering care and protection"' of the Spanish government. 31 In-
deed, noted the Court, they were the "beneficiaries" of a Spanish
law prohibiting the sale of wine to Indians.36
According to the Court, following the course of action adopted
by predecessor governments, the United States similarly had to
protect its "dependent wards,"" 7 for the judiciary attributed "to
the United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and
the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all de-
pendent Indian communities -within its borders." ' 3 The extent of
the necessary protection was, believed the Court, for the Con-
gress, not the judiciary, to determine.3 9 Moreover, the Court
maintained that, considering the pueblo people's "Indian lineage,
isolated and communal life, primitive customs and limited civil-
ization, this assertion of guardianship over them cannot be said
to be arbitrary." '40
31. Id.
32. Id. at 43.
33. Id. at 44.
34. Id. at 40-41.
35. Id. at 45, quoting United States v. Ritchie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 525, 540 (1854).
36. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 44, citing Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 225
(1845).
37. Id. at 45.
38. Id. at 46.
39. Id., quoting Tiger v. western Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286, 315 (1911).
40. Id. at 47. The Court in one of the concluding paragraphs of the opinion unsur-
prisingly distinguished United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614 (1876), a case determining the
19821 NOTES
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Inferior in Civilization
From the Sandoval Court's perspective, the Pueblo Indians'
uncivilized way of life manifested, for example, in their pagan,
tyrannical, and familial practices, 4' merited congressional tutelage
of the group through exercise of plenary power. So too the in-
ferior character of the group's members, reflected, for instance,
in their ignorance and immorality,42 figured in the Court's deci-
sion that the pueblo was a dependent community. Nevertheless,
there was at least one trait of the Pueblo Indians drawing affir-
mation from the Sandoval Court: they were "sedentary rather
than nomadic in their inclinations." ' 43 The Sandoval Court, there-
fore, could not rely on nomadic wandering as an indicator of the
need for plenary power pupilage. When the Court in other cases
found this cultural aspect, however, it used nomadic life-style as
a measure of civilization. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States,
44
a case determined in 1955, furnishes an example of the Court's
resort to this cultural factor.
The plaintiff in Tee-Hit-Ton was an Alaskan tribe seeking gov-
ernment compensation for timber taken under a congressional
statute authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to contract for
timber sales. 45 After denying the Indians' contention that they
held recognized title to the lands on which the timber had been
located, 46 the Court went on to entertain the tribe's contention
that, though unrecognized, its interest in the land was such that
the tribe deserved compensation. Included within the portion of
the opinion introducing the Court's discussion of this contention
was a declaration of the "supreme" power of the Congress to ter-
minate nonrecognized title, that is, title based on aboriginal
possession. 7 The Court further declared that it had never held
that Congress' exercise of this supreme authority compelled com-
pueblo people as not being Indians subject to congressional power, see supra note 21 and
accompanying text, as dealing with a different issue and deciding upon facts "which are
at variance with other recognized sources of information, now available." Sandoval, 231
U.S. at 48-49.
41. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
42. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
43. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 39.
44. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
45. Id. at 276-77.
46. Id. at 278-79. Recognized title exists "[w]here the Congress by treaty or other
agreement has declared that thereafter Indians were to hold the lands permanently." Id.
at 277.




pensation for the taking of land despite the fact that the "drive
of civilization" stripped Indians of their homes and hunting
grounds.48
The Court returned to the notion of civilization later in the
opinion when it considered an argument mounted by the plain-
tiff. The Indians maintained that their "stage of civilization," as
well as their ownership through use and possession at the time
when Russia first claimed Alaska, raised their interest in the lands
to one of proprietary stature.49 The Court responded negatively
to this argument as well. The facts that the group purported to
pass tribal membership only through the female line, maintained
tribal instead of individual title, and allowed other tribes to share
its lands,5" did not seem to help the Indians' civilization and
ownership argument. Moreover, their "hunting and fishing stage
of civilization," characterized by frequent resettlement hinging
on availability of game and fish, plainly militated against the In-
dian position and contributed to the Court's conclusion that the
Indians' use of the lands "was like the use of the nomadic tribes"
of the lower states. 5'
While Tee-Hit-Ton thus relied on nomadic tendencies as a ra-
tionale for denying relief requested by a tribe, Cramer v. United
States," decided in 1923, discussed Indian migration within the
context of policy dictated by the federal government. A discus-
sion of Indian wandering surfaced in the Court's determination
of two issues in Cramer. First, Cramer partially canceled a grant
of land to a railroad in favor of Indians who had continuously
occupied the land for more than sixty years with the implied con-
sent of the government and in accordance with federal policy."
With respect to the clash of the railroad's land claim with federal
policy, the Court sided with federal policy, describing it as one of
"inducing the Indian to forsake his wandering habits and adopt
those of civilized life." 5 The Court refused to grant the
railroad's claim of priority over government policy, for to have
decided against the Indians would have been to contravene the
"whole spirit of the traditional American policy toward these
dependent wards of the nation," since the Indians had harmon-
48. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 281.
49. Id. at 285-86.
50. Id. at 285-87.
51. Id. at 287-88.
52. 261 U.S. 219 (1923).
53. Id. at 230.
54. Id. at 227.
1982] NOTES
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ized their lives with the government's desires by "abandoning
their nomadic habits and attaching themselves to a definite local-
ity, reclaiming, cultivating, and improving the soil and
establishing fixed homes thereon.""
A second issue considered in Cramer was whether the United
States had authority to sue on behalf of the three Indians occupy-
ing the disputed land. 6 In discussing this issue, the Cramer Court
referred to the policy of the government to "teach" Indians and
to "jersuade them to abandon their nomadic habits."" Con-
comitantly, the Court perceived that the need to promote such
policy argued forcefully for capacity to sue on the part of the
United States. 8 In determining this issue the Court also asserted
that, given the status of Indian tribes as "wards of the nation,
communities dependent on the United States .... [the] duty of
protection and power extend[s] to individual Indians, even
though they may have become citizens." 5 9 This duty and power
would persist, observed the tribunal, until Congress thought it
appropriate to "emancipate Indians from their wardship." 60 This
assertion by the Cramer Court had itself been an issue in In re
Heff,6' decided in 1905. While studying the railroad's land claim
as well as the United States' capacity to sue, the Cramer Court
found significant the federal policy diverting the government's
Indian charges from their nomadic ways. In Heff the Court had
referred to the transient Indian life-style, and policy had also
assumed importance; more precisely, shifts in policy and their im-
pact upon the duration of Indian wardship became focal.
Heff decided that congressional legislation prohibiting sale of
55. Id. at 228-29. Concerning the final issue before the Court in Cramer, the deter-
mination of a remedy, the Court decided that while the Indians asserted a right to 360
acres, only that portion "clearly fixed by the inclosure, cultivation, and improvements,"
id. at 235, or in other words, only that portion civilized, belonged to them. The Court
found this determination to be "in accordance with the general rule that possession alone,
without title or color of title, confers no right beyond the limits of actual possession." Id.
at 236.
56. Id. at 232.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 233 quoting United States v. Fitzgerald, 201 F. 295, 296 (8th Cir. 1912).
59. Id. at 232. Carter has pointed out the rather contrived nature of Cramer's ap-
plication of the plenary power doctrine. Carter noted that although Indians who had oc-
cupied the same land for more than fifty years had ostensibly fulfilled the government
policy objectives geared to stabilize and thus civilize Indians, the Cramer Court still found
the Indians involved needed plenary power protection. Carter, supra note 3, at 223.
60. Cramer, 261 U.S. at 233.




liquor to Indians did not encompass those Indian allottees62 who,
while not undertaking ownership of land in fee simple, had
become citizens of the United States. After briefly summarizing
the facts and subject of the case, the Heff opinion began with the
recognition that the relationship between the government and the
Indians was "that of a superior and an inferior, whereby the lat-
ter is placed under the care and control of the former." 63 Heff
next considered the policy history of the government that, in an
earlier time, sought "sometimes by treaties and sometimes by the
use of force to put a stop to the wanderings of these tribes and
locate them on some definite territory or reservation, there estab-
lishing for them a communal life."" The Heff Court proceeded,
pointing out that although Indian communal settlement was a
policy in the past, Congress in the plenitude of its power ex-
pressed a new policy through its legislation, "a policy which
looks to the breaking up of tribal relations, the establishing of the
separate Indians in individual homes, free from national guard-
ianship .. ."6 The Heff Court recognized that, in accordance
with this policy, the government sought "to relieve some of the
Indians from their tutelage." ' 6 The Court recognized further that
Congress could cease to exercise its protective power without vio-
lation of any obligation, and Congress could terminate the ward
relationship without accountability in courts of law.67 The Heff
Court concluded that Congress, by enactment of the Allotment
Act, had indicated its termination of duty to and power over
allottee Indians."' Consequently, the Court determined that the
Indians in this case were not Indians for purposes of congres-
sional liquor legislation.
69
Eleven years after Heff, the Court in 1916 expressly overturned
the case and held that those selling whiskey to allottee Indians
whose lands were still in trust violated the congressional law pro-
62. The Indian General Allotment Act of Feb. 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388, found now at
25 U.S.C. § 331 (1976), provided a procedure whereby Indians would assume individual
ownership of lands as opposed to tribal. The Act prescribed an interim period during
which the lands would be held in trust by the United States before passing in fee to the In-
dian owner. The Act also granted citizenship to Indians.
63. In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 498 (1905).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 499.
66. Id. at 501.
67. Id. at 499.
68. Id. at 504-05.
69. Id. at 509.
1982]
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hibiting such sales. United States v. Nice,70 the case overruling
Heff, located the sources of congressional power to enact the
legislation in both the Indian commerce clause and in the plenary
authority of Congress to discharge its protective duty. It was,
asserted Nice, for Congress to determine the time of Indian
"emancipation" from pupilage and dependency-the time when
Indians were "prepared to exercise the privileges and bear the
burdens of one sui juris."7 1 The High Court admitted Heffs
mistaken reading of Congress' intent as to the time when the
guardian-ward relationship was to end under the Allotment Act.
72
Indeed, to the Nice Court, the Act "disclosed in an unmistakable
way" that during the interim trust period, the "education and
civilization of the allottees and their children were to be under the
direction of Congress. . . .
While in Nice the Court exhibited a change of opinion as to
when Indians became civilized, the underlying thrust of civilizing
Indians is common to both Nice and Heff and apparent too in
the 1903 case of United States v. Rickert.7" The Rickert Court
essentially determined that neither real nor personal property of
allotment Indians was subject to state taxation while the United
States held the Indians' lands in trust before they assumed fee
ownership. The Court centered its reasoning upon the perception
that the Indians, during the interim period, were still "wards of
the Nation, in a condition of pupilage and dependency" and not
yet "discharged from that condition. "7 Thus, the Court claimed
the established relation between superior and inferior contin-
ued.76 According to the Court, the interim time implemented a
"national policy by which Indians are to be maintained as well as
prepared for assuming the habits of a civilized life."" The Court
went on to point out that Congress allotted lands with the expec-
tation that they would be "improved and cultivated," 78 and to
conclude that to tax either the lands or land improvements would
impermissibly interfere with the federal government's control
over its dependents. 79 The Rickert Court then proceeded to state
70. 241 U.S. 591, 601 (1916).
71. Id. at 598.
72. Id. at 601.
73. Id. at 600.
74. 188 U.S. 432 (1903).
75. Id. at 437.
76. Id. at 443, quoting Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 28 (1886).
77. Rickert, 188 U.S. at 437.
78. Id. at 442.




that not only lands and improvements but also personal property
consisting of cattle, horses, and other livestock were purchased
by the government for Indians in order to "induce them to adopt
the habits of civilized life."8 0 Therefore, just as the Court could
not condone taxation of the land or improvements, it could not
allow taxation of personal property for such a tax would have
had the effect of defeating the government's civilizing purpose.8
Next, the Rickert Court confronted objections to the United
States' prosecution of the suit on behalf of Indian interests. The
United States, decided the Court, by virtue of its policy-making
authority, its interest in the property, and its relation to "these
dependent Indians still under national control," properly sued to
prevent the imposition of taxes8 2 the United States would ulti-
mately pay on behalf of Indians. s3 The Court concluded by sug-
gesting that states dissatisfied with the exemption of allottee In-
dians from taxes address their complaints to Congress because
"[Ut is for the legislative branch of the Government to say when
these Indians shall cease to be dependent and assume the respon-
sibilities [of tax burdens] attaching to citizenship." 84
Inferior in Character
Sandoval demonstrates the Court's interpretation of the in-
feriority of Indian civilization in its customs and government as
well as the consequent assertion of the need for protection and
tutelage.85 Other opinions reinforce the thrust of Sandoval's view
by revealing distaste for the wandering way of life86 and the
general desire to civilize the dependent race.87 Yet, the uncivilized
condition of Indians is not the only theme of Sandoval. Indians
are said to be plagued also by ignorance, immorality, and intem-
perance.88 Other cases pick up this thread of character degrada-
tion.
In 1914, a year after Sandoval criticized the intemperance of
Indians, Perrin v. United States89 considered the subject. In sus-
80. Id. at 443-44.
81. Id. at 444.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 438.
84. Id. at 445.
85. See supra notes 20-29, 34-40 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 43-64 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 65-84 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
89. 232 U.S. 478 (1914).
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taining a conviction for the sale of liquor upon lands ceded to the
United States at the time of allotment and subsequently passing
into private hands, the Perrin Court found that Congress, as op-
posed to states, had the power to prohibit the sale of liquor upon
ceded lands even if neither the sellers nor the buyers were In-
dians. The Court initiated its reflections with the observation that
both the Indian commerce clause and the plenary power doctrine
confer authority on the Congress to regulate liquor on Indian
reservations." Similarly, reasoned the tribunal, "this power to
protect the government's Indian wards against the evils of intem-
perance, of which they are easy victims," extends to ceded
lands.91 To buttress its analysis, the Court pointed out that both
the Indians themselves and government commissioners agreed
that the "welfare of Indians" required the regulation. 92 The
Court then affirmed the reasoning that "'[i]f liquor is injurious
to them inside of a reservation, it is equally so outside of it ....
It is easy to see that the love of liquor would tempt [Indians] to
stray beyond their borders to obtain it.'-9 In addition, accord-
ing to the Court, not only reason but obligation supported the
validity of such liquor regulations: "'This stipulation was not
only reasonable in itself, but was justly due from a strong govern-
ment to a weak people it had engaged to protect."' 94 Therefore,
the Perrin Court pronounced, such a measure "[i]n this situation,
and having some regard to the weakness of Indians in respect of
the use of intoxicants," 95 fails to stray from the "right concep-
tion of power of Congress in dealing with Indian wards and
adopting measures for their protection.' ' 9
While a taste for spirits may have been one weakness of In-
dians, as Sandoval and Perrin indicated, it was not the only
blemish the Court imputed to Indian character. Like Sandoval,
United States v. Chavez,97 a 1933 case, involved the Pueblo In-
dians. This time, however, the issue was not the power of Con-
gress to prohibit liquor but whether a non-Indian violated
federally enacted law when engaging in larceny of pueblo live-
90. Id. at 482.
91. Id. at 483.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 484, quoting United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 195
(1876).
94. Perrin, 232 U.S. at 484 quoting 43 Gallons, 93 U.S. at 197.
95. Perrin, 232 U.S. at 486.
96. Id. at 485.




stock. The opinion adopted much of the Sandoval language in
summarizing the crude, superstitious, and primitive nature of In-
dian civilization, and it echoed Sandoval in labeling the pueblo
people a "simple, uninformed and dependent people." 98 The
High Court shed light on these words, in the same sentence, by
describing the Pueblo Indians as "easily victimized and ill-
prepared to cope with the superior intelligence and cunning of
others." 99
Chavez again mirrored Sandoval in pointing out that this
dependent group fell under the wing of Congress by virtue of
both the Indian commerce clause and the power inherent in the
duty of protection. ' For the Chavez Court, given the way of life
of the Pueblo Indians as well as their plight in being "ill-prepared
to cope with the superior intelligence and cunning of other"
races, it was "difficult to believe that Congress . . . was not in-
tending to protect them" from crimes such as the larceny at issue
when it enacted criminal legislation.'01
The Court in Tiger v. Western Investment Co.102 also discussed
the difficulty Indians have in coping with other races, but addi-
tionally focused on the general incompetence of Indians instead
of on their inferior intelligence. Decided in 1911, Tiger deter-
mined that a conveyance by an Indian without approval of the
Secretary of the Interior as demanded by congressional legislation
was invalid. Tiger further decided that Congress had the power to
legislate the approval condition even though it extended aliena-
tion restrictions beyond the time stipulated in a prior treaty.
Justifying the time extension, the Court explained that Congress
had always undertaken "to deal with the Indians as dependent
people, and to legislate concerning their property with a view to
98. Compare id. at 361, with United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39 (1913).
99. United States v. Chavez, 290 U.S. 357, 361 (1933). In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 498
(1905), similarly evaluated the intellectual vulnerability of Indians during its discussion of
policies (see generally text accompanying notes 61-69 supra) invented by the federal
government to deal with Indians:
While this policy [of establishing permanent settlements] was in force, and this location
of wandering tribes was being accomplished, much of the legislation of Congress ran in
the direction of the isolation of the Indians, preventing general intercourse between
them and their white neighbors in order that they might not be defrauded or wronged
through the superior cunning and skill of those neighbors.
197 U.S. at 498.
100. United States v. Chavez, 290 U.S. 357, 362-63 (1933), quoting United States v.
Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45-46 (1913).
101. Chavez, 290 U.S. at 364.
102. 221 U.S. 286 (1911).
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their protection as such.' ' 0 3 The Court then explained further
that it had frequently affirmed the principle that Congress has
plenary power over tribal property of the dependents. 104 Within
the scope of this power, elaborated the Court, was Congress' pre-
rogative to determine when this state of "'dependency and tute-
lage, which entitles [Indians] to care and protection'" ends. 05
Returning to this proposition later in the opinion, the Court
framed it in other words: Congress, not the courts, determined
whether the "true interests" of Indians merited continued
tutelage.'0 6 Applying the proposition, the Court decided that
although Congress conferred citizenship on Indians, citizenship
did not in itself terminate dependency, for "[i]ncompetent per-
sons, though citizens, may not have the full right to control their
persons and property."' 17 Therefore, concluded the Tiger Court,
when Congress restricts "alienation of Indian lands in the promo-
tion of what it deems the best interest,"'' 0 of its Indian wards, it
acts legitimately. 09
The year following Tiger, the Court explained the case in
Choate v. Trapp."10 Choate read Tiger as involving Congress'
power to extend the period of Indian "disability." According to
Choate's version of Tiger, Tiger concerned a situation in which
Congress, taking into account Indian "inexperience," had acted
not only to protect the Indian against "those who might take ad-
vantage of his incapacity" but also to "protect him against
himself.'"
The 1913 case of Monson v. Simonson,'1 like Tiger, involved
the disposition of allotted lands. In the Monson case, however,
the Court did not not concern itself with Indians' incapacity, but
rather with their thriftlessness. Also contrasting the case with
Tiger was the fact that, in Monson, both parties were non-
Indians claiming land previously owned by an Indian. In order to
resolve the question as to which party had received valid title, the
103. Id. at 310.
104. Id. at 311.
105. Id. at 313-14, quoting Rainbow v. Young, 161 F. 835 (8th Cir. 1908).
106. Tiger, 221 U.S. at 315.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 316.
109. Id.
110. 224 U.S. 665 (1912) (holding that an act containing a provision exempting allotted
land from taxation for a limited time conferred a fifth amendment property right im-
munizing its Indian holder from state taxation).
111. Id. at 678.




Court raised an underlying issue. This root question was whether
an Indian could convey land immediately after Congress enacted
legislation authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to issue
patents to the Indian or whether the land could only be conveyed
after the Secretary in fact issued the final patent passing full and
unrestricted title. In favoring the latter position, the Court looked
to congressional intent for a rationale. Among the purposes of
the Allotment Act, the Court found the aim of "conducting the
individuals from a state of dependent wardship to one of full
emancipation . . . Realizing that so great a change would re-
quire years... and that in the meantime Indians should be safe-
guarded against their own improvidence," ",3 Congress took pains
to avoid passing full and unrestricted title too quickly. ' 14
In Heckman v. United States,"5 the High Court also reflected
upon the improvident character of Indians in determining a sub-
sidiary issue of the case. In the main, the 1912 case decided the
United States had the ability to sue on behalf of Indians claiming
the invalidity of conveyances executed in violation of a congres-
sional extension of alienation restrictions. However, the case also
weighed the contention that Indians ought to have been parties to
the suit so that a court could have compelled them to return con-
sideration they accepted during the invalid transaction. The
Court rejected this suggestion, declaring "[i]t is plain" that
recovery of consideration cannot be a precondition to cancella-
tion of the transfer. 16 "Otherwise," reasoned the Court, "if the
Indian grantor had squandered the money, he would lose the land
which Congress intended he should hold, and the very incompe-
tence and thriftlessness which were the occasion of the measures
for his protection would render them of no avail.""17
Inferior in Claim
In scrutinizing the Court's interpretation of the inferior char-
acter of Indians, one is concerned with the purported deficiencies
of the race's individual members-their inferior intelligence," 8 as
well as their immorality, 9 intemperance,1 0 incompetence,' 2' and
113. Id. at 345.
114. Id. at 345-46.
115. 224 U.S. 413 (1912).
116. Id. at 446.
117. Id. at 446-47.
118. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 31-32, 89-96 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 102-111 and accompanying text.
1982]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons,
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
improvidence.' 22 In contrast, when considering the inferior claims
of Indians, the entire race is pitted against the whole of white
America. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,'23 a 1903 case, illustrates the
subordination of interests.
First, the plaintiff in Lone Wolf claimed that Congress had
enacted an agreement in direct violation of a treaty provision
precluding transfer unless consented to by a defined percentage
of tribal males. Although the government and the Indians had ne-
gotiated an agreement, the requisite number of tribal males had
never approved the agreement. The plaintiff further alleged
fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of government inter-
preters who falsely translated provisions of the agreement, and
finally, that Congress, before enacting the agreement, had changed
provisions without submitting the alterations to the Indians for ap-
proval.1 2 Nevertheless, the Court held that given the power of
Congress, the Court could not "specially consider" any of the
plaintiff's claims.' 25
After reciting the facts and the contentions, in the first sentence
of its response to the plaintiff's claim of treaty violation the Court
noted the "dependency" of the Indians.' 26 In the second sentence
the Court declared that to favor the claim would be to restrict ser-
iously the power of Congress to protect Indians "and to deprive
Congress, in a possible emergency when the necessity might be
urgent for a partition and disposal of the tribal lands, of all the
power to act, if the assent of the Indians could not be ob-
tained.,,,27
The opinion then explained the plenary power of Congress by
virtue of "guardianship over [Indian] interests." The Court next
referred to an earlier case in which it had "'presumed'" that the
"'United States would be governed by such considerations of
justice as would control a Christian people in their treatment of an
ignorant and dependent race'"; in other words, exercise of
plenary power was immune from judicial review. 1 8 The Court
subsequently returned to the notion of a claim superior to that of
Indians' and established that Congress has the power to abrogate a
treaty, "though presumably such power will be exercised only
122. See supra notes 112-117 and accompanying text.
123. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
124. Id. at 561.
125. Id. at 567.
126. Id. at 564.
127. Id.




when circumstances arise which will not only justify the govern-
ment in disregarding the stipulations of the treaty, but may de-
mand, in the interest of the country and the Indians themselves,
that it should do so.' 129
Although both Lone Wolf and Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United
States' 3 arrived at the same destination, namely, that the Indian
claims were inferior, the Court in each case pursued a different
route. In Lone Wolf the reader finds the superior claim described
vaguely, finds assertions of Congress' need to act in "emer-
gency," and of "the interest of the country and the Indians them-
selves." On the other hand, in Tee-Hit-Ton, the Court was
somewhat less timid about naming the superior claim: the Indians
were divested of their lands "by the drive of civilization,' 1 3' by
the "growth of the United States."'132
Each opinion also approached differently the conclusion that
the Indian claim was an inferior one. In Lone Wolf, the Court
concluded it could not even entertain the Indians' allegations
given the dominance of congressional plenary power. In Tee-Hit-
Ton, the Court essentially conceded the Indians suffered a
wrong: "Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes
of the continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by
force."'133 Although admitting the claim, the Tee-Hit-Ton Court
stamped it with a kind of legal inferiority, that is, the Court pro-
nounced the claim incapable of judicial remedy. In developing its
analysis, the Court resorted to the identical quotation on which
Lone Wolf had relied presuming the government to be christian
in its dealings with an "'ignorant and dependent race.' 1"3 The
Court then found that although the "American people" in their
"compassion" have sought to ensure that Indians "share the
benefits" spawned by "our society," provision for recovery by
Indians was a matter of generosity, "a matter of grace, not...
of legal liability." ' 3 From the perspective of the Tee-Hit-Ton
Court, no solution other than the relegation of the Indians' claim
to the status of a candidacy for generosity was feasible. In other
words, the Court decided that no alternative would solve the
problem posed by the "growth of the United States" other than
129. Id. at 566.
130. 348 U.S. 272 (1955). See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
131. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 281.
132. Id. at 290.
133. Id. at 289-90.
134. Id. at 281, quoting Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877).
135. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 281-82.
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recognizing the discretion of Congress to make gratuitous "con-
tributions," as opposed to binding the government to an "obliga-
tion" to pay for "taken" lands.'3 6 The Court in Tee-Hit-Ton
concluded by observing that its decision to deny compensation to
the Tee-Hit-Tons for the taking of their timber "leave[s] with
Congress, where it belongs, the policy of Indian gratuities for the
termination of Indian occupancy of Government-owned land."'
Prejudicial Interpretation and Discriminatory Response
Tee-Hit-Ton's conclusion that the Court's decision "leave[s]
with Congress, where it belongs"' 38 the dispensation of gratuities
to Indians leads one back to the question prefacing the survey of
Supreme Court plenary power opinions. What is it about Indians
that induced the Court to believe that control over Indian matters
"belongs" with Congress? In other words, why is it necessary to
protect Indians? The preceding section of this paper has at least
impliedly provided the answer. This section develops an explicit
answer.
The language of the Court, especially that language conveying
the Court's concern with Indian civilization and character, re-
flected a typical interpretation by the Court. The Court at one
time or another manifested its opinion about Indian religious,
government, child-rearing, marital, and migratory practices, and
about Indian civilization in general.' 39 Equally plain was the
Court's attitude about Indian character-the Court's beliefs con-
cerning Indian intelligence, morality, and competence, as well as
concerning Indian drinking and fiscal habits.'4 Yet, though a
reader of the Court's decisions arrives at the conclusion that the
Court adopted a specific stance, can the reader with equal cer-
tainty label the interpretation prejudicial, and more specifically,
call it negatively prejudicial?
A dissection of the operation of prejudice reveals that "the
most common mechanism for maintaining prejudice is stereo-
typing."'' The number and repetitiveness of the Court's asser-
tions about Indian culture and character present in the opinions
136. Id. at 290.
137. Id. at 291.
138. Id.
139. See supra notes 22-29, 41-84 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 30-33, 85-117 and accompanying text.




rise to this level of generalization.' And just as stereotyping
generalizations clue the observer to the presence of prejudice,
drawing lines between inferior and superior alerts one to the
operation of negative prejudice."4 3 Although the Court itself ex-
pressly described the relationship between the government and In-
dians as one in which the Indians were inferior,' Cohen's essay,
The Vocabulary of Prejudice,'5 adds support to the conclusion
that negative prejudice was at work in the midst of the Court's
development of the plenary power doctrine.
Cohen maintained that words have weighted values. He illus-
trated this contention with the example, "I am firm. You are
obstinate. He is a pig-headed fool.' ' 4 6 In other words: We
migrate or travel. Indian nomads wander.'4 7 We are defrauded.
Indians are victims of superior intelligence and cunning. We
recognize the power of the presidency. Indians subject themselves
to one-man domination. We practice a religion. Indians tend to
superstition. We have made a bad deal. Indians are thriftless. We
spend money. Indians squander it. In sum, we are superior. In-
dians are inferior.
Indians, believed the Court, in their religious, government,
child-rearing, marital, and migratory practices approached the
uncivilized. Furthermore, according to the Court, they were ig-
norant, intemperate, immoral, incompetent, and improvident in
character. It is understandable, then, how the Court's conviction
of Indian inferiority invited the Court to assume a corollary at-
titude of protectiveness toward Indians: Indians, being inferior,
needed protection and pupilage. And even this corollary attitude
of protectiveness reflected the superior/inferior dichotomy
typical of negative prejudice: We are protectors. Indians are
dependents and wards. The words "dependents" and "wards,"
or grammatical variations of these words, occur again and again
in the legal literature. Their presence is so frequent that one
might be inclined to discount them as legal terms of art. Yet,
142. Another related mode of reinforcing the attitude of prejudgment is the
maintenance of contented ignorance about the subject being prejudged. Id. at 14.
Although less certainly present than stereotyping, lack of knowledge on the part of the
Court in terms of lack of actual experience with Indians is not unimaginable.
143. See id. at 14.
144. In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 498 (1905); United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 443
(1903). See supra notes 63, 76 and accompanying text.
145. Cohen, The Vocabulary of Prejudice, in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 429 (L. Cohen
ed. 1960).
146. Id. at 432.
147. Id. at 434.
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however innocent their usage may appear, even these words are
weighted; they both carry and reinforce attitudes of prejudicial
superiority."n8
The Court's interpretation of Indian contributions to
American society was an interpretation negatively prejudicial.
Both the Court's prejudicial attitude toward Indians and its cor-
ollary prejudging attitude of protectiveness reflected a superior/
inferior dichotomy. By itself, however, demonstration of the
Court's negative prejudice sheds little light on the development of
the plenary power doctrine. Behavior as well as attitude is impor-
tant. For example, although an employer may be biased against
Indians, his bias does not necessarily dictate that the employer
will not hire an Indian.'4 9 Prejudicial attitude is one thing;
discriminatory behavior, another.' 50 Although in the judiciary's
attitude amounting to negative prejudice one discovers the roots
of the plenary power doctrine, it is in the judicial behavior
amounting to discrimination that one finds its genesis. The
substance of judicial behavior is the reasoning and rendering of
decisions. A brief excursion into the field of jurisprudential
thought on legal reasoning will demonstrate the formulation and
application of the plenary power doctrine as an act of discrimina-
tion.
Levi described the process of legal thinking as reasoning by
analogy-pairing the facts of the case at hand with the facts and
rule of a similar case. "The problem for the law is: When will it
be just to treat different cases as though they were the same?"''
Applying and answering Levi's question in the context of Indian
plenary power cases suggests the discriminatory nature of the
doctrine. The Court has never found it just to treat cases unre-
lated to Indian affairs the same as plenary power cases. First, in
its formulation of the plenary power doctrine the Court subjected
Indians to a discriminatory process of reasoning. When dealing
with Indians the Court has made an unprecedented leap by rea-
soning from the duty of protection to the power of control irre-
spective of constitutional anchors for its ruling. When dealing
with Indians the Court has said simply, such power "must
exist," '152 even if the Constitution fails to authorize such power.
148. Id. at 430.
149. See DANIELS & KITANO, supra note 16, at 22.
150. Id.
151. E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948) reprinted in part in G.
CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE 963, 964 (West 1973).




Second, in its application of the doctrine, the Court has dis-
criminated. Predictably, the Court has applied a doctrine uni-
quely reasoned to suit Indians only in Indian cases. Only Indians
have been subjected to this extraordinary, extraconstitutional
principle.II
While the Court, then, manifested a prejudicial attitude toward
Indians, it was the Court's action on the basis of this attitude that
gave birth to the plenary power doctrine. The Court responded to
the situation according to its interpretation of the situation. See-
ing an inferior people, in need of protection and instruction, the
Court responded by generatifg and applying a doctrine tailored
to the race's need: there being the duty of protection, there is the
power.
Plenary Power Protection and Pupilage
Racist and Ethnocentric Sources of the Plenary Power Doctrine
A survey and analysis of the language used by the Court in
plenary power cases compels the conclusion that the Court launched
the doctrine as a discriminatory response to its prejudicial inter-
pretation of the Indian condition. Yet, the investigation fails to
terminate with this finding because further analysis is necessary to
153. The plenary power doctrine was applied not only to full-blood Indians but also
to those of mixed blood. The fact of mixed blood, however, arguably affected the doc-
trine's application, as the case of United States v. Waller, 242 U.S. 452 (1917), illustrates.
Waller centered around the interpretation of a congressional act. On one hand, the act
removed all alienation restrictions upon lands allotted to mixed-blood Indians. On the
other, the act demanded that the Secretary of the Interior be "satisfied that . . . adult
full-blood Indians are competent to handle their own affairs" before granting them a fee
simple patent for their lands. Id. at 461. In Waller the United States sought to bring suit
to cancel conveyances fraudulently obtained from mixed-blood Indians. The Court denied
the capacity of the United States to sue on behalf of the mixed-blood Indians. The Court
based its decision upon the finding that the congressional act embodied a legislative intent
to grant full control to the mixed-blood Indians with respect to their lands. Id. at 462.
Thus, reasoned the Court, since the act had released the mixed-blood Indians from their
wardship with regard to land transactions, the United States had no interest in the lands,
and consequently, no capacity to sue. Id. at 463. The Court explained its reasoning by
declaring that the act "evidences a legislative judgment that adult mixed-blood Indians
are, in the respects dealt with in the act, capable of managing their own affairs, and for
that reason they are given full power and authority to dispose of allotted lands." Id. at
462. The Court next noted that the Congress' assumption that all mixed-blood Indians are
capable may have been erroneous with regard to some cases, for "it is quite evident that
the Indians here involved were incapable of making an intelligent disposition of their
lands." Id. Yet, concluded the Court, "Congress dealt with general conditions" and dealt
having "authority over the subject"; therefore, "[i]t is not for the courts to question this
legislative judgment." Id.
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specify the exact nature of the negative prejudice. On the one
hand, did the Court's prejudice rise to racist proportions? Or, on
the other, was the Court's prejudice ethnocentric in its hue? A
necessary precondition for answering these questions is an under-
standing of racism, ethnocentrism, and the distinction between
these two species of prejudice.
Racism is a composite of three elements: (1) the conviction that
America is a white country and the concomitant intolerance of
nonwhite institutions; (2) the sense that white people comprise an
inherently superior strain of humanity; and (3) the fear whites
harbor about nonwhites.'"4 This description of racism is identical
to that of ethnocentrism except in one respect. The principal
distinction between the two lies in a variation of the second ele-
ment. While racism attributes inherent inferiority to a race,
ethnocentrism does not contend that the inferiority is of an innate
variety.15 Before considering the sense of superiority the Court
assumed, however, this study discusses the first element of the
composite, the institutional clash between the races.
The Court's concept of Indians as inferior in civilization re-
flected its conviction that America is a white country intolerant
of nonwhite institutions. Generally, the Court believed the Indian
way of life to be a primitive one. s6 Specifically, the Court es-
poused the view that the Indians' communal economy, religious
rituals, government structure, and family life-style did not meet
the standards required in white America.I 7 The Court gauged In-
dians to be relatively uncivilized and recognized the plenary
power doctrine's utility in eliminating uncivilized practices and
inducing and teaching Indians to adopt a civilized way of life. s8
The intolerance of the Court is especially evident in its disaffec-
tion for Indian migration and its promotion of the plenary power
as a means of obliterating the nomadic mode of existence. 9
As plain as the Court's intolerance of Indian cultural institu-
tions is its opinion that Indians were an inferior race. The second
element of the composite, racial inferiority, coincides with the
Court's interpretation of Indians as deficient in character, as be-
154. D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 42 (1980).
155. DANIELS & KITANO, supra note 16, at 2. Another distinction between racism and
ethnocentrism is that the latter may have as its target an ethnic or other group as well as
racial groups. Id. at 2.
156. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 22-29, 40-84 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., supra notes 37-40, 54-60, 64, 73, 77, 80 and accompanying text.
159. See generally supra notes 54-60, 64 and accompanying text.
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ing ignorant, immoral, intemperate, incompetent, and improvi-
dent.'60 The question when considering this component is not so
much white America's conviction of Indian inferiority in char-
acter but whether this inferiority was of an inherent variety; that
is, whether the Court operated with a racist or an ethnocentric
frame of mind.
The language best illustrating doubts about the Court's convic-
tion of Indians' inherent inferiority is that of tutelage and
pupilage.' 61 Such terms infer that the Court believed Indians
could be transformed, that some day Indians would reach a
degree of progress enabling their emancipation from their state of
dependency, wardship, and incompetence.' 62 Indeed, the entire
thrust of the policy background of the plenary power doctrine's
formulation was confidence in the ability of Indians to assimi-
late.' 63 This line of thought, then, leads to a conclusion that the
prejudice of the plenary power had ethnocentric rather than racist
roots.
Yet, the Court's language characterizing Indians as "essen-
tially" an "inferior people" 1 64 counsels against ethnocentrism as
the sole source of the plenary power doctrine. In addition, when
the Court found plenary power protection necessary in part
because of "Indian lineage," ,65 it is even more questionable that
the Court operated on ethnocentric assumptions alone. Perhaps
most telling, however, is the Court's belief that non-Indians pos-
sessed "superior intelligence. "166 The Court's expression of such
beliefs as well as the Court's unqualified language expounding
upon Indians' weakness for liquor,' 67 and their thriftless bent,'
68
strongly suggest that the Court believed it was dealing with an in-
nately inferior order of humanity as it developed the plenary
power doctrine. In sum, the argument that both ethnocentric and
racist biases had a hand in the genesis of the doctrine is plausible.
160. See supra notes 23, 31-33, 89-117 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., supra notes 57, 66, 75, 105 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., supra notes 60, 71, 75 and accompanying text.
163. See generally D. GETCHES. D. ROSENFELT, C. WILKINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 69-79 (West 1979) [hereinafter cited as GETCHE et al.].
164. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39 (1913). See supra note 23 and accom-
panying text.
165. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 47 (1913). See supra note 40 and accom-
panying text.
166. United States v. Chavez, 290 U.S. 357, 361, 364 (1933). See supra notes 99, 101
and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 31, 91 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 113, 117 and accompanying text.
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Of course, before claiming that either of the two varieties of pre-
judice were present, the third element of the scheme, the fear of
Indians, needs attention.
The Court's conviction about the inferiority of Indian civiliza-
tion reflected intolerance of nonwhite institutions. The Court's
opinion about the inferiority of Indian character mirrored an
assumption of white racial and ethnocentric superiority. In the
same parallel fashion, the Court's assertion of claims superior to
those of Indians' manifested fear of Indians. Lone Wolf and Tee-
Hit-Ton"19 impliedly suggested the basic fear evoked by Indians,
that is, the fear of Indians' plausible claim to the land. The land
greed rampant during the years of the allotment era, 1871 to
1928,170 set the stage for the Lone Wolf decision in 1903. Lone
Wolf glossed over treaty abrogation and consequent deprivation
of Indian lands with vague notions of congressional emergency,
as well as national and Indian interests. The Tee-Hit-Ton Court
recognized past exploitation of Indians, but absolved itself with
the declaration that, given the non-Indian need for land, the
Court's only choice was to refer Indian claims to the discretion-
ary generosity of Congress.
While one senses the fears evoked by Indian land claims in
Lone Wolf and Tee-Hit-Ton, in Heckman v. United States,
7 1
another case involving Indian land claims, one finds explicit ad-
mission of fears harbored by the Court. Heckman grew out of an
attempt by the United States on behalf of Indians to cancel some
thirty thousand conveyances made in violation of a congressional
extension of alienation restrictions on Indian lands. Heckman
dealt with a portion of the 3,715 conveyances transacted by
Cherokee Indians. Two of the defendant grantees appealed to the
Court for reversal of an unfavorable decision by the court
below. 172 A central issue in the case was whether the United
States had the capacity to sue on behalf of the Indian grantors.
During the course of its deliberations, the Heckman Court
discussed the "right and duty" of Congress to enforce alienation
restrictions as well as to legislate them.' 73 This power, noted the
Court, related not only to the "welfare of the Indians" but also
169. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955); Lone Wolf v. Hitch-
cock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). See supra notes 123-37 and accompanying text.
170. See GETCHES et al., supra note 163, at 71. See generally Carter, supra note 3, at
211.
171. 224 U.S. 413 (1912). See generally supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
172. Heckman, 224 U.S. at 415.
173. Id. at 437, 441-42 quoting McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U.S. 458, 469 (1907).
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to the "interest of the United States" because "[o]ut of its
peculiar relation to these dependent peoples sprang the obliga-
tions to the fulfillment of which the national honor has been
committed." 174 As one reads farther into the opinion, however,
one finds that national honor is not the only stake of the United
States in the litigation.
The Heckman Court approvingly quoted an opinion issued by
the court below asserting that a land transfer violating the con-
gressional restrictions not only tread on Indians' proprietary
rights but also "'violates the governmental rights of the United
States. If these Indians may be divested of their lands, they will
be thrown back upon the Nation, a pauperized, discontented,
and, possibly belligerent people."'' ' The Court immediately
followed this quotation with the conclusion that the "authority to
enforce [such] restrictions .. is the necessary complement of the
power to impose them."' 76 After considering, in addition, provi-
sions by Congress expressly authorizing government suits, the
Court decided the United States had the ability to sue for can-
cellation of the conveyances. "
In sum, the themes of inferiority running through plenary
power legal literature are significant not only as indicators of
negative prejudice on the part of the Court but also as evidence
of the species of prejudice at work. The Court's attitude that
white civilization was superior to that of Indian civilization
reflected the Court's intolerance of nonwhite institutions. Fur-
thermore, the Court's conviction of Indian character inferiority
substantiates the thesis that the Court saw Indians as an inferior
group. Finally, the Court's avoidance in Lone Wolf and Tee-Hit-
Ton of valid Indian claims as well as the Court's concern in
Heckman with the prospect of "'a pauperized, discontented,
and, possibly belligerent people"' indicates the Court's fearful
and defensive posture. Taken together, these three elements-
institutional intolerance, group superiority, and fear-form a
composite picture of racist and ethnocentric prejudices operating
during the development of the plenary power doctrine.
Functions of the Plenary Power Doctrine
Though an examination of the Court's language may explain
174. Id. at 437.
175. Id. at 438.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 442-44.
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the plenary power doctrine as a discriminatory response to a
racist and ethnocentric interpretation ascribing inferiority to In-
dians, such a survey does not fully clarify the emergence of the
doctrine. This study began by asking why it was necessary to pro-
tect Indians with congressional plenary power. A survey of the
Court's opinions revealed the answer: because Indians are in-
ferior. Yet, the answer to the question leads to a further inquiry
asking: why was it necessary to attribute inferiority to Indians?
This phase of the study attempts to respond by suggesting how
the plenary power doctrine, apparently devised for the protection
of Indians, performs functions of questionable protective value
to Indians.
Higginbotham has pointed out in his comments on antiblack
statutes that laws "subtly cast in the language of lawyers, can
make one oblivious to the fact that the lives of human beings
were involved."' 78 Thus, when the racist says the innate inferiority
of Indians makes them properly subject to the rule of a superior
order of humanity, chances are the hearer will recognize the state-
ment as racist. However, when the Supreme Court of the United
States proclaims-as it did in the 1959 case of Williams v. Lee-
that the "Federal Government's power over Indians is derived...
from the necessity of giving uniform protection to a dependent
people," and supports its statement by citing precedent, 79 the
reaction may well be different. Chances are that the reader
recognizes the assertion only as a principle of law. The words
"dependent people" assume a kind of innocence. It is likely that
the reader sees only the language of lawyers and is unaware of
prejudicial slur. Furthermore,- only those versed in Indian law
have the background allowing them to comprehend that the pre-
cedent on which the Court relied-Kagama-is overtly pre-
judicial. Yet, paradoxically, those versed in Indian law, handling
frequently the concept of Indians as wards and dependents, are
most likely -to see the words as terms of art rather than as terms
of prejudice. To be sure, even today the Court itself describes In-
dian tribes as dependent and resorts to decisional authority
marked by prejudice. 8
178. L. HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR 13 (1978).
179. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 n.4 (1959) citing United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375 (1886).
180. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, (1981). ("[E]xercise of tribal power beyond
what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is in-
consistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express
Congressional delegation.") Among other cases, Montana cited United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886).
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When the law deals with Indians, then, it deals not with per-
sons but with dependents and wards designated as such by time-
honored legal processes. And the operation.of the plenary power
doctrine has other functions aside from its dehumanizing effects.
Indeed, an attribute of discrimination is its power to legitimate
and sustain the inferiority of a group.18" ' Daniels and Kitano have
further illuminated the effectiveness of discrimination by explain-
ing: "Once discrimination is institutionalized, it pervades the en-
tire system so that those with racial prejudices find validation for
their biased prejudgments, while those without initial ...pre-
judice eventually adhere to what has been known in the past as
the 'earned reputation' theory."18
The pertinence of these comments to the plenary power doc-
trine needs little emphasis. The age of a doctrine dating back to
the late nineteenth century as well as its consistent usage per-
suasively establishes the doctrine's institutionalization within the
legal world. And predictably, an institutionalized principle borne
of notions that Indians not only were relatively uncivilized but
also immoral, unintelligent, intemperate, improvident, and in-
competent fueled the beliefs of those already committed to pre-
judice. Yet, this legitimating function is less tragic than the doc-
trine's complicity in earning Indians a reputation they did not
merit. Those already convinced of Indian inferiority could doubt-
less find other ways of validating their bigotry; the plenary power
doctrine simply provided one more tool. On the other hand, the
Court introduced those uncommitted to prejudice to a new way
of viewing Indians: Indians are inferior; they need protection. Al-
though the Court has exorcised most of the derogatory language
it found in the past to be indispensable, even today the judiciary
performs this maintaining function. Those operating within the
legal system and dealing with the doctrine are soon initiated to a
concept that may never have crossed their minds: Indians are a
dependent people. It is not far-fetched to suggest that the unini-
tiated become accustomed to the concept, conform their own
thinking to it, and ultimately internalize the notion.
It is important to remember that non-Indian litigants, judicial
personnel, and government agents are not the only persons who
operate within the legal system and deal with the plenary power
doctrine. The doctrine, of course, affects Indians also. The doc-
trine and its explanation in the past may have contributed to the
181. DANILS & KITANO, supra note 16, at 28.
182. Id.
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internalization of inferiority by some Indians. Alternatively, the
doctrine may have validated and maintained hostility to the legal
process on the part of others. In addition, whatever impression
the doctrine has made upon hearts, plenary power doubtless af-
fects Indian legal strategy. If Indians want to engage in adjudica-
tion involving the doctrine, they must conform to the roles the
doctrine ascribes to them. For instance, in Tee-Hit-Ton, the
Court's interpretation of the doctrine holding that Congress
deemed compensable only recognized title to land forced the
tribal plaintiff to contend that, although unrecognized, it had a
proprietary interest in the land. Whatever the Indians themselves
may have believed, the Court's construction reduced them to
arguing that their "stage of civilization" had transcended the in-
ferior level traditionally attributed to Indian culture and had ad-
vanced to a degree commensurate with white standards.' 83 Further-
more, the doctrine not only can force Indians to adopt a demeaning
strategy but also can result in a kind of legal schizophrenia for all
who deal with the doctrine in a period marked by conflicting
governmental policy. To be sure, the identity of Indians as depend-
ent upon the wisdom of Congress to determine their best interests
clashed with the era of self-determination seriously inaugurated in
the early 1970s.'4 The only way to avoid such a conflict is to adopt
the paradox that Congress concluded that self-determinaton was in
the best interest of a dependent people.
The fragmentation of a coherent legal approach to Indian af-
fairs, legitimation and maintenance of a superior/inferior dichot-
omy, and legal language dehumanization are all functions of the
plenary power doctrine. Yet, these effects serve to raise further
questions rather than to answer the initial one. For example, why
was it necessary to validate and maintain the dichotomy? And,
reverting to the initial query of this phase of the study, why was it
necessary to propound a doctrine mounted on a prejudicial foun-
dation? The quest for an understanding of plenary power pre-
judice could terminate with observations about the "unsavory"
hue of human nature.'85 After all, the propensity to secure self-
esteem by leveling others is a tempting and, in fact, credible ex-
planation.'8 6 On the other hand, by seeking to determine the
183. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955). See supra notes 49-51
and accompanying text. See generally Postow, Thomas on Sexism, in SEXisT LANGUAGE
271, 274 (M. Vetterling-Braggin ed. 1981).
184. See generally GErCHEs et al., supra note 163, at 106-19.
185. DANIELS & KITANO, supra note 16, at 17.
186. See generally Ketchum, Moral Redescription and Political Self-Deception, in




benefactors of the doctrine, additional understanding of the doc-
trine's functions is possible.
The doctrine in its seminal state apparently functioned to pro-
tect Indians from victimization by state criminal processes an-
tagonistic toward Indians.' 87 In time the doctrine protected the
Indian from the "superior intelligence and cunning" of white
neighbors,' 8 and moreover, protected the Indian "against him-
self."'8 9 Despite these descriptions of the doctrine's intended
operation, when one confronts factors contributing to the
Court's decisions in specific instances, a different dynamic
emerges. In Rickert, for instance, one finds that protection of
government policy, devoted to conferring civilization upon In-
dians, from interference by the imposition of state taxes upon In-
dian property was not the only consideration militating against
taxation. The Court realized that if it recognized state taxing
power, the federal government would ultimately assume the
costs. ' 9° Moreover, the plenary power doctrine in both Lone
Wolf and Tee-Hit-Ton was clearly disadvantageous to Indians
and advantageous to non-Indians. In both cases Indians lost their
land claims to the government.'91
Cases such as Rickert demonstrate that Indians have not been
the only beneficiaries of plenary power.'92 Cases such as Lone
Wolf and Tee-Hit-Ton undermine the notion that plenary power
operated primarily for the benefit of Indians. As a matter of fact,
the Tee-Hit-Ton Court itself undercut the proposition that
government control was intended to benefit Indian land interests.
Tee-Hit-Ton rejected the plaintiff tribe's reliance on a case
upholding a Philippine native's land claim against the United
States' claim of ownership. The Tee-Hit-Ton Court distinguished
Carino v. Insular Government of the Philippine Islands from the
facts before it by noting: the Carino Court based its decision on
the United States' purpose in acquiring the Philippines; this pur-
pose "was to administer property and rights 'for the benefits of
187. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
188. United States v. Chavez, 290 U.S. 357, 361 (1933). See supra note 99 and accom-
panying text.
189. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 678 (1912). See supra note 111 and accompany-
ing text.
190. United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 438 (1903). See supra note 83 and accom-
panying text.
191. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955); Lone Wolf v. Hitch-
cock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). See supra notes 46-51, 123-37 and accompanying text.
192. Such cases also support Bell's insight that the interests of minorities progress
only when coinciding with self-interests of the majority or perceived national interests.
BELL, supra note 154, at 7.
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the inhabitants thereof.""" Tee-Hit-Ton then proceeded to ex-
plain how this beneficial purpose differed from the purpose ef-
fected in North America: "The purpose in acquisition and its ef-
fect on land held by [Philippine] natives was distinguished [by the
Carino Court] from the settlement of the white race in the United
States where the 'dominant purpose of the whites in America was
to occupy the land."' 1 94
A search for the true benefactors ineluctably leads to the con-
clusion that a concrete and core function of the doctrine has been
deception fostering the self-interests of white America. By
fabricating inferiorities in Indians, the Court justified rule over
them.I95 Not only has the doctrine been deceptive by virtue of the
manufactured inferiorities predicating it; more significantly, the
doctrine has deceptively portrayed the relationship between In-
dian and white America and this deception has accommodated
exploitation. Plenary power casts the relationship between In-
dians and whites into a distinct mold. White America is the
guardian, protector, teacher. Indian America is the ward, de-
pendent, pupil. Plenary power posits white America as the pro-
vider, Indian America as the beneficiary. Yet, the truth of the
matter is that it was Indians who provided the crucial resource-
land-upon which the growth of white America depended. 9 By
distorting the relationship between Indian and white America,
plenary power deception has contributed to the enhancement of
self-esteem of guardian whites. By distorting the relationship, the
doctrine also has played a role leading to concrete gains for the
protectors. The doctrine has propounded white America as the
protector of the true interests of Indians during times when the
doctrine's effects were anything but protective. The Court's own
admission distinguished the purpose of administering property
for the benefit of its inhabitants from the purpose motivating
white treatment of Indians in America "where the 'dominant
purpose of the whites . . . was to occupy the land.' ",9'
Unprejudiced Protection
The plenary power doctrine is a troubling phenomenon. Pre-
193. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 284 n.18 (1955), citing
Carino v. Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, 212 U.S. 449 (1909).
194. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 284 n.18, quoting Carino, 212 U.S. at 458.
195. See generally Ketchum, supra note 186, at 283.
196. Id. at 281.
197. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 284 n.18, quoting Carino, 212 U.S. at 458. See supra




dicated on a fabricated set of inferiorities obligating "superior"
white America to rule the Indian, the formulation and applica-
tion of the doctrine amount to an act of judicial discrimination.
The circumstances of the doctrine's birth are embarrassing to a
legal system holding out the guarantee of impartial tribunals.
Moreover, as this study's introduction pointed out,' 98 the doc-
trine is troubling in another sense. In a legal sysiem demanding
constitutional authority as a precondition for federal action, the
plenary power is a free-floating peculiarity, unrelated to a clause
of the Constitution.
Of course, the operation of the plenary power doctrine has not
been an unmitigated catastrophe. At times the doctrine has
sheltered Indian interests, or, at the very least, has promoted In-
dian concerns when these have coincided with the perceived in-
terests of a nation. Yet, it is doubtful that the beneficial effects of
the doctrine outweigh its harmful ramifications to such an extent
that the doctrine merits judicial perpetuation. Reinforcing this
doubt is the fact that the courts can support congressional action
with an alternative legal rationale lacking the flaws of the plenary
power doctrine. Two facts persuasively advise resort to the Indian
commerce clause 99 instead of plenary power as a better approach
to Indian affairs. First, measures implemented under the Indian
commerce clause, or under the necessary and proper clause"'0
allowing measures related to the regulation of Indian commerce,
would plainly carry the validating mark of explicit constitutional
authority. Second, the rationale for Indian commerce clause
measures would justify an enactment in terms of its effectiveness
in keeping the arteries of Indian commerce free from obstruction.
Analysis would concentrate on commerce rather than on the
dependent status of a race. Courts would not have to legitimate
congressional legislation by relying on a principle borne of a
superior/inferior dichotomy.
While the future of the prejudicial doctrine ultimately rests in
the hands of the judiciary, Indian advocates, too, figure in the
doctrine's fate. However, the fact that an advocate seeks to ad-
vance the claims of Indian clients instead of presiding as a dis-
interested decision-maker complicates the advocate's choices with
respect to the doctrine, especially when invocation of the doctrine
affords the strongest chance for prevailing in litigation. Even
assuming a client chooses to submit the doctrine as a line of argu-
198. Supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
199. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
200. Id., art. I, § 8, &l. 18.
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ment in order to maximize chances of success within a legal con-
text, an advocate, by arguing alternative theories in addition to
plenary power, can still promote the demise of the doctrine. By
supplying analytics similar to those used in connecting congres-
sional action with the Constitution's interstate commerce
clause,2"' advocates can aid courts in making the transition from
reliance on plenary power to reliance on the Indian commerce
clause. Advocates can also propel this transition when they are in
a posture opposing plenary power action. When facing adver-
saries justifying congressional action on plenary power grounds,
Indian advocates can question the doctrine's constitutional
authority. Alternatively, they can, in their pleadings, frame the
issues as ones involving the Indian commerce clause rather than
the plenary power doctrine. Finally, they can credibly contend
that the plenary power doctrine itself violates the spirit, if not the
letter, of the Constitution's promise of equal protection of the
laws.
201. Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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